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ABSTRACT 
In 2015, Nokia announced the acquisition of its French-based competitor Alcatel-
Lucent in an all-stock agreement. By the end of 2015, Nokia announced the organizational 
structure composed of four business groups: Mobile Networks, Fixed Networks, 
Applications & Analytics, and IP/Optical Networks. After the acquisition, Nokia has been 
evolving its operational structure, with changes such as creation of new business groups 
and changes in the support functions, among others. But despite the natural evolution of the 
organizational design of a large corporation, the business group model followed the 
acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent was not only maintained but also strengthened with the 
creation of new BGs. In October 2019, however, Nokia announced the share payment 
policy to be paused until new notice, due to a lag in the race of the latest mobile broadband 
technology called 5G against its main competitors. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Everybody knows what Nokia is, a legendary brand in the mobile phone industry. 
But a telecom infrastructure equipment is not as exciting as a brand-new, wide-screen, 
integrated-camera cell phone for most people. During at least 30 years, Nokia has been part 
of that industry aimed to provide the communication service providers (CSP) the needed 
equipment to sell the services that people consume in a daily basis through its 
communication devices such as a cell phone, a desk phone, a laptop, or even a TV. Today, 
the telecom infrastructure equipment is Nokia’s core business, but in the mid-2000s, that 
portion of the Nokia business was handled separately from Nokia Mobile Phones. At that 
time, Nokia decided to join forces with the German giant Siemens to create a 50 / 50 joint 
venture named Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) in 2006. 
After a turbulent decade in the 2000s that brought troubles in both the declining 
Mobile Phone market (due to the lagging behind in the race of creating a thriving mobile 
phone ecosystem against Apple and Google) and the problems faced by NSN due to the 
“difficulty competing against mobile network giants Ericsson and Huawei Technologies.” 
(Lawson, 2013), Nokia started a restructuring plan of the NSN in 2011 aimed to emphasize 
on mobile broadband by focusing “on mobile network infrastructure and services market, 
targets significant operating expense and production overhead savings, and workforce 
reduction of approximately 17,000.” (Nokia Corporation, 2011). Under Rajeev Suri’s 
leadership, the CEO, NSN has been “turned from a lossmaking joint venture with 
Germany’s Siemens into a profitable, wholly owned subsidiary.” (The Economist, 2013). In 
July 2013, “Nokia agreed to buy back Siemens' share of the company for $2.2 billion and 
make it a wholly owned subsidiary.” (Lawson, 2013). 
NOKIA announced the divestment from the Mobile Phone industry in 2013, and 
after the transformation of its core business from a handset device manufacturer into a 
telecom infrastructure equipment provider focused on Mobile Broadband Access, it 
announced the acquisition of its rival ALCATEL-LUCENT (from now on also referred as 
ALU) in 2015. The M&A process was planned to face fierce competition in the telecom 
infrastructure industry and put pressure over the main rivals Ericsson and Huawei. The 
main objectives of the acquisition were to “provide an end-to-end portfolio of products, 
software and services” and to “achieve approximately EUR 900 million of operating cost 
synergies in full year 2018” (Nokia Corporation, 2015).  
By the end of 2015, Nokia announced the organizational structure composed of four 
business groups: Mobile Networks, Fixed Networks, Applications & Analytics, and 
IP/Optical Networks. In 2016, Nokia completed the acquisition of all the ALU shares. The 
new Nokia will be grouped in the Nokia Networks business (from now on also referred to 
NOKIA) 
In October 2019, however, Nokia announced the share payment policy to be paused 
until new notice, due to a lag in the race of the latest mobile broadband technology called 
5G against its main competitors. The market reacted negatively by dropping the share by up 
to 30%. Some analyst thinks there are more reasons behind this announcement than a pure 
technology race. Stefan Pongratz from Dell’Oro Group stated that:  
Nokia is honing-in specifically on these increased costs of the FPGA versus ASICs. 
That can explain part of the story. But if you take the overall business, there is more 
going on here than just FPGA migration. (Hardesty, 2019) 
 
TELECOM EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY 
The telecom equipment market revenues were USD 319 billion in 2016, but it is 
expected to grow up to USD 500 billion by 2022 (see Exhibit 1). This industry is targeted 
to run the back-end solutions, from hardware to software to services, needed to provide 
communication services to people, companies, and nowadays, things. The industry players 
design, develop, build, sell, implement, operate, optimize, and provide post-sales 
maintenance services to the equipment needed to build networks by the IT and the 
Communications Service Providers (CSP) operators. Marketwatch defines 
telecommunications equipment as a “general designation of hardware and software systems 
that transmit, receive, or transmit speech, text, data, images, or any other information of any 
nature by means of electromagnetic or light wired or wireless.” (Matketwatch, 2019). 
Some analysts split the market into two main segments: wireless and wired telecom 
equipment. Dell’Oro, a reputed telecom market analyst, has segmented the market in seven 
domains: Broadband Access and Home Networking, Carrier IP Telephony, Microwave 
Transmission & Mobile Backhaul, Mobile Radio Access Networks (RAN), Optical 
Transport, Router and Carrier Ethernet Switch, and Wireless Packet Core. Also, the two 
largest equipment markets in 2018 were Mobile RAN and Optical Transport (Pongratz, 
2019). 
In 2018, 80% of the market revenue was accounted by the seven major 
manufacturers: Huawei, Nokia, Ericsson, Cisco, ZTE, Ciena, and Samsung (Pongratz, 
2019). Huawei is the leader and accounts for 28% of the telecom equipment market share 
(3Q18 through 2Q2919) (Weissberger, 2019). Exhibit 2 shows the telecom equipment 
market share.  
Over the Top (OTT) players such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and 
giants in the e-commerce such as Amazon, Alibaba, eBay, and many others, are the actors 
who are making more money in the telecom chain. Applications such as Whatsapp are 
reducing revenues from the telecom operators in SMS and phone calls. This pressure in the 
income of the operators is pushing hard to reduce their investments in CAPEX and OPEX. 
And that pressure is bypassed to the telecom equipment manufacturers. Due to that reason, 
consolidation is a significant trend in the telecom market, in both the operators (CSPs) and 
manufacturers. Nokia and Siemens in 2006, Alcatel and Lucent in 2006, Oracle and SUN in 
2010, Ceragon and NERA in 2011, Ericsson and Telcordia in 2012, Tellabs and NSN 
Optical Networks (2013), Dell and EMC in 2015, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent in 2016, Nokia 
and Comptel in 2017, Infinera and Coriant in 2018, Ericsson and Kathrein in 2019, and 
multiple small acquisitions and divestments in all the segments, are a sample of the 
dynamics of this sector in the manufacturer side. 
Another central trend in the telecom market is the use of open hardware 
architectures to reduce the dependency of telecom manufacturers. Today, most of the 
applications run in cloud data centers powered by x86 architecture servers, where IT 
players such as HPE, DELL/EMC, Oracle-SUN, Lenovo, and other telecom manufacturers 
such as Huawei and Nokia have products. Other initiatives to have open hardware are under 
development in the industry including Open Switches, Open Routers, and Open RAN, 
among others. In that sense, the hardware is becoming a commodity, moving the industry to 
the software as the main differentiator. To overcome this challenge, Nokia announced four 
key priority areas, one of them was to build a strong, standalone software business in 
November 2016. In May 2017, Bhaskar Gorti, president of Applications & Analytics at 
Nokia, said: 
As the next step in our strategy to build a standalone software organization at scale, 
we are making major investments in our software and service capabilities that will 
help customers build strong digital businesses. We want to eliminate the need for 
customer service calls by avoiding issues in the first place. We also want to give 
service providers the ability to better understand and contextualize consumer needs. 
(Nokia Corporation, 2017) 
 
NOKIA COMPANY BACKGROUND 
Nokia has a long-standing history of change. In fact, Renewal is part of its values. 
Nokia started as a pulp mill factory in 1865. In 1902, Nokia expanded its business to 
electricity generation. By 1967, Nokia had businesses in forestry, cable, rubber, and 
electronics. In the 80s, Nokia acquired many companies such as television makers, 
electronics and computer makers, and a mobile telephony maker, among many others 
(Wikipedia, 2019). That was the origin of the legendary Nokia Mobile Phones business.  
In 2006, Nokia had four business groups, but three out of the four were focused on 
mobile phones (Mobile Phones, Multimedia, and Enterprise Solutions). The fourth business 
group was Networks, accounting for 18,12% of Nokia’s revenues, but only 13,54% of the 
operating profit (Nokia Corporation, 2007). In June 2006, Nokia and Siemens announced 
the intention to create a joint venture by combining “Nokia’s networks business and the 
Siemens’ carrier-related operations for fixed and mobile networks in a new company 
owned approximately 50% of each Nokia and Siemens and consolidated by Nokia” (Nokia 
Corporation, 2007, p. 16). 
In 2009, Rajeev Suri was appointed as CEO of NSN. In the same year, Nokia 
announced a plan to improve its financial performance, market position, and increase 
profitability.  
By 2011, Nokia faced fierce competition in the mobile phone industry. Apple and 
Google were successful in creating a sustained ecosystem, and they gained business track 
and market share in that industry. Nokia recognized its mobile phone’s operating system, 
Symbian, was not competitive enough in leading markets and signed a partnership with 
Microsoft to construct a new ecosystem for smartphones (Nokia Corporation, 2011). At the 
same time, Nokia announced that NSN had “received expressions of interest from private 
equity firms seeking to invest.” (Nokia Corporation, 2011). In the same year, NSN 
announced a turnaround plan to focus on mobile broadband and related services. The Nokia 
press release stated: 
These planned measures are expected to include elimination of the company's 
matrix organizational structure, site consolidation, transfer of activities to global 
delivery centers, consolidation of certain central functions, cost synergies from the 
integration of Motorola's wireless assets, efficiencies in service operations, and 
company-wide process simplification (Nokia Corporation, 2011).  
2013 was an exciting year for Nokia, announcing the acquisition of the Siemens 
stake in NSN (renaming NSN as Nokia Solutions and Networks) and the divestment of the 
mobile phone market. Nokia was a significantly different company, with a solid 
infrastructure business coming from NSN, the HERE location and mapping business, and 
the licensing and patenting business. Risto Siilasmaa, Chairman of Nokia, stated: 
At the same time, we had a share in a network-infrastructure joint venture, NSN, 
which had been spun off some years earlier. Both Nokia and Siemens had, in effect, 
given up on the network business as noncore. As a stagnating joint venture, NSN 
and its management had been incentivized either to become an IPO or a trade-sale 
asset. At one point, each parent company funded NSN with $500 million—and 
basically said that was it: “Go bankrupt if you will, but you will not get a penny 
more.” The fact that it subsequently became a vibrant business just emphasizes the 
fantastic turnaround that Rajeev Suri [now Nokia’s president and CEO] and his 
team pulled off there from 2011 on. (McKinsey, 2016) 
In 2015, before the ALU acquisition, Nokia was a solid company, with revenues of 
EUR 12.49 billion by the end of that year (see Exhibit 3). The company accounted for net 
cash of EUR 7.77 billion, and more than 56,000 employees worldwide, spread in around 
130 countries across the globe (Nokia Corporation, 2016). The company was expending 
about 18 percent of its revenues in R&D. In this year, Nokia sold HERE, its business 
related to digital mapping and location services to a German automotive industry 
consortium.  
The two main businesses were Nokia Networks (former NSN), a leading 
infrastructure provider for mobile networks and related services, and Nokia Technologies 
aimed to leverage innovation and to manage its patent and licensing business (Nokia 
Corporation, 2016).  
Nokia Networks represented 92% of the Nokia revenues. Nokia is denominated by 
itself as the world’s mobile broadband specialist. It was segmented in two primary 
businesses: Mobile Broadband and Global Services. The most important region was 
Europe, followed by the Middle East & Africa (see Exhibit 3).  
Mobile Broadband business unit provides solutions for mobile voice and data 
services through two clusters: Radio and Core. The Radio cluster covers all the 
technologies related to RAN and investing actively in the next generation of RAN 
technology: LTE-Advanced and 5G. The Core cluster includes the switching portfolio, 
voice and packet solutions. The Core cluster is also developing CEM (Customer 
Experience Management) solutions, virtualization and software-rich solutions (Nokia 
Corporation, 2015, p. 22).  
Global Services business unit “provides mobile operators with a broad range of 
services, from network implementation to care services, managed services for network and 
service operations, network planning and optimization and systems integration.” (Nokia 
Corporation, 2014). 
A telecom solution in the mobile broadband industry requires both products and 
services. Despite there were two main businesses inside Nokia Networks, both were 
interdependent and closely linked. The Global Services provide both product-attached 
services and professional services, mainly for the products sold by Mobile Broadband. 
Although Nokia had two divisions, both were related to the same business, so it could be 
classified as a functional organization. Risto Siilasmaa stated: 
Because even after moving entirely into networking, Nokia was a one-trick pony. 
We were mobile-broadband specialists, and we couldn’t deliver an end-to-end 
experience (McKinsey, 2016) 
  
ALCATEL-LUCENT COMPANY BACKGROUND 
Alcatel-Lucent (ALU) was formed after the merge of Alcatel (a France-based 
company) and Lucent (a United States-based company) in November 2006. It was 
headquartered in Boulogne-Billancourt, France. After the merge, “Lucent shareholders 
would own 40 percent of the combined company, with Alcatel shareholders owning 60 
percent.” (Bajaj, 2006). 
Both former companies had roots in the telecommunication industry since the late 
19th century: Alcatel from La Compagnie Générale d'Electricité (CGE), and Lucent from 
the  Western Electric Manufacturing Company (Wikipedia, 2019). CGE was a 
conglomerate formed in 1898 and businesses in electricity, transportation, electronics, and 
telecommunications. In 1991, CGE changed its name to Alcatel Alsthom (Wikipedia, 
2019). From the Lucent side, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was created from 
the purchase of Western Electric by Bell Telephone Company in 1877 (Reference for 
Business, 2019). Bell Telephone Laboratories (Bell Labs) was established in 1907. AT&T 
was split into three companies in 1996, one of them was Lucent. Lucent also acquired most 
of the Bell Labs (Reference for Business, 2019). 
Since the merge, ALU had been struggling with inefficiencies and cross-cultural 
differences, leading to six quarterly losses (Nordick, 2016). In 2011, ALU reported its first 
positive operating profit (EUR 921 million), in contrast with the operating losses of EUR 
159 million in 2010 (El País, 2012). 
In June 2013, ALU launched a three-year strategic plan called “The Shift Plan” 
designed to transform the ALU core business from an end-to-end telecom provider to a 
player focused on IP and cloud networking, and ultra-broadband specialist (Alcatel-Lucent, 
2015, p. 12). The plan also considers the expansion “of the customer base to new emerging 
customer segments such as cable service providers web-scale, large tech enterprises or 
vertical business.” (Alcatel-Lucent, 2015, p. 17). Aligned with the strategic view of the 
ALU businesses, ALU created three main segments – Core Networking (IP Routing, IP 
Transport, and IP Platforms), Access (wireless and fixed networks), and Others – each with 
a tighter and more controlled portfolio (Alcatel-Lucent, 2015, p. 34). ALU also was 
structured with three organizations with specific focuses: Operations, Sales, and Strategy 
and Innovation. Additionally, it was supported by three corporate functions: Finance and 
Legal, Human Resources, and Marketing. 
2014 was “the first year of positive free cash flows (excluding restructuring) for the 
company since Alcatel and Lucent’s merger in 2006.” (Forbes, 2015). 
By the end of 2015, ALU had revenues of EUR 14.3 billion, expenditures of around 17% of 
its revenues in R&D, and approximately 50,000 employees in more than 100 countries (see 
Exhibit 4). 
The organization structure was aligned by the segments, and each segment had the 
following product divisions (Alcatel-Lucent, 2016) 
 Core Networking 
o IP Routing 
o Terrestrial Optics 
o Wireless Transmission 
o Submarine 
o Network Build & Implementation IP 
o IP Platforms & Platforms Professional Services 
o Strategic Industries 
 Access: 
o Wireless and Network Build & Implementation Wireless 
o RFS – Radio Frequency Systems 
o Fixed Access and Network Build & Implementation Fixed 
o Multivendor Maintenance 
o Leasing 
o Managed Services 
The telecom equipment segment attended by each ALU product division is quite 
different, and according to the ALU internal division, each product division has its own 
services organization. In that sense, it could be classified as a multi-division organization.  
 
THE ACQUISITION OF ALCATEL-LUCENT 
According to Michel Combes, CEO of former Alcatel-Lucent, “Nokia had initially 
approached Alcatel to buy only its wireless business but, after getting rebuffed, agreed to 
buy the whole company” (Forbes, 2015).  
In April 2015, Nokia announced the acquisition of ALU in an all-stock deal, valuing 
Alcatel-Lucent at EUR 15.6 billion. It corresponds to a fully diluted premium of 34% 
(equivalent to EUR 4.48 per share) and a premium to the shareholders of 28% (equivalent 
to EUR 4.27 per share). After the acquisition process, ALU shareholders owned 33.5% of 
the combined company, and Nokia shareholders owned 66.5%. The target operating cost 
synergies announced was EUR 900 million to be achieved in 2019, plus EUR 200 million 
of reduction of interest expenses to be achieved in 2017 (Nokia Corporation, 2015). 
Besides the announced financial benefits in terms of cost synergies and interest 
expenses, one of the most important objectives of the ALU’s acquisition was the 
complimentary portfolios to create a truth end-to-end network provider. Rajeev Suri stated: 
In the face of fast-rising bandwidth and other performance demands, customers 
know they need to take an architecture-driven, end-to-end approach that Nokia 
offers, with a coordinated, holistic view across all elements of the network (Nokia 
Corporation, 2018) 
Additionally, Alcatel-Lucent provided complimentary geography. Exhibits 3 and 4 
show the revenues by geography, where it is evident that Nokia was not performing as well 
as Alcatel-Lucent in the highest profitable market of the telecom equipment industry, the 
U.S. Forbes stated: 
It is pertinent to note that Alcatel-Lucent is a very strong player in the U.S. wireless 
equipment market, having long standing contracts with the major carriers- Verizon 
and AT&T, as well as in the global service provider router market with the second 
highest share after Cisco. (Forbes, 2015) 
The market reacted positively to the acquisition announcement. According to the 
Financial Times, “Nokia’s shares rebounded on Wednesday, rising 4.7 per cent to €7.84 
after falling 3.6 per cent on Tuesday. Alcatel’s suffered the reverse phenomenon, falling 9 
per cent to €4.06 after a 16 per cent jump on Tuesday.” (Milne & Thomson, 2015). But not 
all analysts reacted positively. Juha-Pekka Helminen, Nokia’s former strategy director, 
wrote on Twitter “Doing merger with Alcatel crazy . . . Alcatel-Lucent is and will be a mess 
[plus the] French government” (Milne & Thomson, 2015) 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN A POST-MERGER INTEGRATION PROCESS 
Integrating a business into the acquirer’s operations involves six major activities 
that fall loosely into the following sequence: (i) Premerger planning; (ii) Resolving 
communication issues; (iii) Defining the new organization; (iv) Developing staffing plans; 
(v) integrating functions and departments; and (vi) building a new corporate culture.  
Designing an effective organizational setup in a post-merger integration process 
requires knowledge of the target company’s prior organization, some sense as to the 
effectiveness of this organization. There are different organization structures, such as per 
functions, customers, projects, divisions, and matrix, among others. Although there could 
be different organizational setups, they could be summarized as: 
 Functional organizations: organizations to be grouped as per functions. It is 
recommended for single single-business firms, and the main advantage of this setup 
is that “grouping together functionally similar tasks is conducive to exploiting scale 
economies, promoting learning and capability building, and deploying standardized 
control systems.” (Grant, 2016, p. 156). The functional structure is seen as a 
centralized-based organization, with tight control from the CEO and the leadership 
team.  
 Multidivisional organizations: aimed to decentralize the decision-making process. 
Developed in the 1920s to overcome the challenges of diversification. The 
multidivisional structure is seen as a decentralized-based organization, letting the 
divisions full accountability for reaching the business targets of the organization. 
This setting facilitates the divest in case of needed. Matrix organizations: aimed 
functional structures to assign resources to different groups, and those different 
groups could be either per projects, per geographical location, per customers, per 
divisions, etc. 
Large, complex corporations use to have multi-dimensions organizations. Divisions 
(multidivisional structure) are grouped per functions (functional structure), and support 
functions could also be allocated to provide services and / or resources for different 
divisions, functions, customers, and projects (matrix structure). Thus, modern organizations 
are designed as a mix of structures. But the centralized and decentralized management style 
is empowered by the selected organizational design.  
Hasperlagh and Jemison developed an integration matrix to analyze the autonomy 
needed by the acquired firm; the purchaser could choose between absorption, symbiosis, 
preservation, and holding (see Exhibit 5).  
In a post-merger integration process, it is recommended to focus less in what the 
organization looks like and focusing more in how it works (e.g., the processes needed to 
accomplish the business objectives aimed in a merger or acquisition), which is reinforced 
by Bodner and Capron when stated that structure could influence strategy. DePamphilis 
also highlights “the benefits of a well-managed, rapid postmerger integration suggest a 
centralized management structure initially with relatively few management layers.” 
(DePamphilis, 2018) to pursue a common view of objectives and a unified strategy the 
acquisition process, and may gradually evolve to a more decentralized structure to take 
advantage of the benefits of the diversification. 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NOKIA AFTER THE ACQUISITION 
Nokia decided to combine the Alcatel-Lucent into Nokia Networks by creating four 
business groups: Mobile Networks, Fixed Networks, Applications & Analytics, and 
IP/Optical Networks. Nokia Technologies would remain as a separate entity. Nokia stated 
that “Each business group would have strategic, operational and financial responsibility for 
its portfolio and would be fully accountable for meeting its targets” (Nokia Corporation, 
2015). The combination of both Nokia and ALU business units into groups are: 
 Mobile Networks (MN): include Nokia's and Alcatel-Lucent's Radio portfolios and 
most of their Core products including IMS/VoLTE, and Subscriber Data 
Management, as well as “the associated mobile networks-related Global Services 
business” (Nokia Corporation, 2015). 
 Fixed Networks (FN): coming from Alcatel-Lucent's Fixed Networks business, 
aimed to provide both copper and fiber access products and services. 
 Applications & Analytics (A&A): include the main software platforms from both 
companies. The portfolio managed by A&A includes “Customer Experience 
Management, OSS as distinct from network management such as service fulfilment 
and assurance, Policy and Charging, services, Cloud Stacks, management and 
orchestration, communication and collaboration, Security Solutions, network 
intelligence and analytics, device management and Internet of Things connectivity 
management platforms.” (Nokia Corporation, 2015) 
 IP/Optical Networks (ION): coming from Alcatel-Lucent's IP Routing, Optical 
Transport, IP video business, and the Software Defined Networking (Nuage), 
combining with the Nokia’s IP partners and Packet Core portfolio. 
Additionally, Nokia appointed six units for the support organizations: Chief Financial 
Office (CFO), Chief Customer Operations Office (CCOO - responsible for customer 
interaction and sales), Chief Innovation and Operating Office (CIOO), Chief Human 
Resources Office (CHRO), Chief Strategy Office (CSO), Chief Marketing Office (CMO), 
and Chief Legal Office (CLO).  
The organizational structure of Nokia Networks after the merge is shown in Exhibit 6. 
It followed the multidivisional structure drawn as Business Groups (BGs), and each BG 




After the acquisition, Nokia has been evolving its operational structure. In 2017, 
Nokia announced the separation of the Mobile Networks in two closely linked business 
groups: Mobile Networks (focused on products), and Global Services (focused on services 
related to Mobile Networks) (Nokia Corporation, 2017). In that new announcement, it was 
also informed the split of the CIOO in three organizations: a new Chief Operating Office 
(COO), innovation activities to Chief Technology Office, and incubation to CSO. In 2018, 
Nokia announced the renaming of the Applications & Analytics to Nokia Software “to 
better reflect our strategy and focus on building a strong, standalone software business.” 
(Nokia Corporation, 2018, p. 3). In the same year, it was announced a new business group, 
Nokia Enterprise, to “enhance our ability to capture higher-growth, higher-margin 
opportunities as companies progress with their digital transformations.” (Nokia 
Corporation, 2019, p. 5). In 2019, Nokia announced the discontinuing of the COO and the 
distribution of the organization in other groups. (Nokia Corporation, 2019). Both Nokia 
Software and Nokia Enterprise had their own standalone sales force. 
But despite the natural evolution of the organizational design of a large corporation, 
the business group model followed the acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent was not only 
maintained but also strengthened with the creation of new BGs.  
The cost pressure due to the 5G development made some analysts ask about the 
senior management stability in the Mobile Networks business group. According to 
Hardesty, “Nokia has had three different people head up its mobile networks division 
during a four-year time frame. About nine months ago, it replaced the former head of 








EXHIBIT 1: TELECOM EQUIPMENT MARKET SIZE 
 
 
Source: (Holst, 2018)(Holst, 2018) (Holst, 2018) 
 
 
EXHIBIT 2: GLOBAL TELECOM EQUIPMENT MARKET SHARE 
 
 
Source: (Weissberger, 2019) 
EXHIBIT 3: SELECTED NOKIA DATA 
 
End of December (million EUR) 2015 2014 2013 
Revenue by segments 12.499 12.732 12.709 
Nokia Networks       
Mobile Broadband 6.068 6.092 5.528 
Global Services 5.422 5.105 5.752 
Technologies       
Technologies 1.009 565 515 
HERE       
HERE 0 970 914 
Revenue by geography 12.499 12.732 12.709 
Europe 3.813 3.886 3.940 
Greater China 1.712 1.410 1.201 
Asia-Pacific 3.230 3.364 3.428 
North America 1.594 1.919 1.656 
Latin America 973 1.053 1.315 
Middle East & Africa 1.177 1.100 1.169 
Administrative and Selling 
expenses 1.652 1.634 1.671 
Net Income (loss) 1.194 1.171 41 
R&D 2.126 2.364 2.619 
R&D/Sales 17,01% 18,57% 20,61% 
Cash and cash equivalents at 
end of 7.775 5.023 2.309 
Assets 20.926 21.063 25.191 
Liabilities 10.402 12.394 18.531 
Equity 10.524 8.669 6.660 
Headcount (number of employees) 56.690 51.499 55.244 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from (Nokia Corporation, 2014), (Nokia 









EXHIBIT 4: SELECTED ALCATEL-LUCENT DATA 
 
End of December (million EUR) 2015 2014 2013 
Revenue by segments 14.275 13.178 13.813 
Core Networking       
IP Routing 2.669 2.368 2.253 
IP Transport 2.450 2.114 2.120 
IP Platforms 1.661 1.484 1.778 
Access       
Wireless 4.896 4.685 4.510 
Fixed 2.268 2.048 2.069 
Managed Services 262 369 791 
Licensing 56 55 77 
Others       
Others and unallocated 13 55 215 
Revenue by geography 14.275 13.178 13.813 
France 817 771 798 
Other Western Europe 2.101 1.929 2.125 
Rest of Europe 281 282 361 
China 1.459 1.342 1.097 
Other Asia Pacific 1.499 1.289 1.230 
U.S. 5.913 5.488 5.986 
Other Americas 1.192 1.009 1.209 
Rest of world 1.013 1.068 1.007 
Administrative and Selling expenses 1.761 1.621 1.862 
Cash and cash equivalents at end 
of 251 -34 -1.269 
R&D 2.378 2.215 2.268 
R&D/Sales 16,66% 16,81% 16,42% 
Net Cash 4.905 3.878 4.096 
Assets 23.783 21.460 21.896 
Liabilities 18.603 18.766 18.233 
Equity 5.180 2.694 3.663 
Headcount (number of employees) 50.047 52.673 62.311 
 
Source: Created by the author using data from (Alcatel-Lucent, 2015), (Alcatel-Lucent, 
2016) 
 
EXHIBIT 5 – INTEGRATION MATRIX BY HASPESLAGH AND JEMISON 
 
 

















EXHIBIT 6 – NOKIA’S ORGANIZATIONAL SETUP AFTER THE ACQUISITION 
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